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Abstract - In this paper we compare “micro” and “macro” labor supply elasticities in a MaCurdy-type equation. 
Using PSID data, we obtain the micro elasticity from standard panel techniques, and the macro elasticity from 
the time series generated by aggregating individuals every year. This procedure relies on the exact aggregation 
of first-order conditions in a life-cycle model with home production. We find an individual elasticity of about 
0.1, a low value in line with mainstream microeconometric studies, and an aggregate elasticity of about 1, a 
much larger value often assumed in calibration studies. This discrepancy is not due to aggregation bias: it is due 
to the fact that individual and total hours are different variables, with the extensive margin that empirically 
dominates. A broader implication of our result is that micro evidence is not always appropriate for calibrating an 
aggregate model economy. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: E13, E32, J22 
 
Keywords: elasticity of labor supply, aggregation, calibration. 
 
 
We much benefited from conversations with Ed Prescott, Richard Rogerson and Christian Zimmerman at the EDHEC 
conference in Paris (January 2008). We are also grateful to Pierangelo De Pace, Carlo Favero, Francesco Nucci, Giacomo 
Rondina and Gianluca Violante for constructive comments and suggestions. Seminar participants at the Universities of 
Rome-Tor Vergata, Siena, and Italy’s Department of the Treasury, as well as participants at the SED 2008 Meeting in 






Riccardo Fiorito,  University of Siena, Italy. Email: rfiorito@iol.it 




 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The intertemporal substitution of leisure is crucial for explaining business cycles
inmodernmacroeconomics. WhenstatinghowthebenchmarkRBCmodelshould
be calibrated, Prescott (1986) suggested to restrict the stochastic growth model on
the basis of the available micro-econometric evidence:
“A fundamental thesis of this line of inquiry is that the measures ob-
tained from aggregate series and those from individual panel data
must be consistent. After all, the former are just the aggregates of
the latter.” (p. 14).
To reproduce all business cycles facts, however, the benchmark RBC model
requiresamuchlargerelasticitythantypicallyestimatedinmicrostudies. Microe-
conomic studies based on both cross-sectional and panel data estimate the inten-
sive margin of labor adjustment and typically report a small real-wage elasticity
[e.g. Pencavel (1986), Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), MaCurdy (1981), Al-
tonji (1986)], ranging from about 0 to about 0.2 for men and from about 0 to about
1 for married women [Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)]. This difﬁculty is noticed
by several authors such as Heckman (1993), Browning, Hansen and Heckman
(1999) and by Prescott himself (2006).
In the meantime, the macroeconomic evidence is far less numerous, is gener-
ally mixed and typically includes the extensive margin of labor adjustment which
empiricallydominatestheintensiveone[ChoandCooley(1994)]. Intheirseminal
paper, Lucas and Rapping (1969) ﬁnd that, for the US economy (1930-1965), total
hours are strongly real-wage elastic in the short-run (1.4). Among the others, Hall
(1980) ﬁnds an intertemporal elasticity of substitution which is about 0.5, while
Mankiw, Rothemberg and Summers (1985) reject the intertemporal substitution
hypothesis by estimating the intensive margin only, rather than the most appro-
priate aggregate hours changes [Heckman, (1993)]. The importance of including
changes in employment is stressed by Alogoskouﬁs (1987), who shows that when
applied to aggregate employment the intertemporal substitution hypothesis is not
rejected by the US data.
The necessityof reconciling the relative lyhi gha ggr e g at eel as t ic it yas su m edin
calibration studies with the low elasticity estimated in microeconometric studies
brought about a number of different orientations. In some cases [e.g. Summers
(1986), Mankiw (1989)] the whole relevance of the RBC model was denied. A
more constructive orientation explored several variants of the benchmark RBC
1model [i.e. Prescott (1986)] in order to better accommodate the data. A precur-
sor is the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1982) based on non-separability
of leisure at different points in time. This was followed by the lottery [Roger-
son (1988)] and the indivisible labor model [Hansen (1985)] where people either
work a ﬁxed or a zero amount of hours. Among the other relevant extensions, the
introduction of preference shocks [Bencivenga (1992)], government consumption
[Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)], home production [Benhabib, Rogerson and
Wright (1991)], and taxation in general equilibrium [Baxter and King (1993); Mc-
Grattan (1994)] are all noteworthy efforts to add realism and policy focus to the
benchmark RBC model.
More recent studies that generate a wedge between individual and aggregate
labor elasticities have focused on heterogeneous reservation wages [Chang and
Kim (2005) and (2006)], omission of variables such as wealth [Ziliak and Knies-
ner (1999)] and liquidity constraints [Domeji and Floden (2006)], human capital
accumulation [Imai and Keane (2004)]. Needless to say, this list is incomplete.
The research question we address in this paper is whether and to what extent a
small individual elasticity of labor supply is consistent with a large aggregate one.
Thisquestioncannotbeaddressedasanaggregationbiasissue[Theil(1954)]–i.e.
as a situation where the aggregate parameters differ from the averages of the cor-
responding micro parameters – since micro and macro estimates of the elasticity
of labor supply do not refer to the same variable. Typically, micro estimates deal
with individual hours of work per unit of time (intensive margin), while macro
estimates deal with total hours of work, i.e. the product of the intensive margin
and the employment rate (extensive margin). In fact we exploit this difference to
compare in a fully consistent way “micro” and “macro” labor supply elasticities
referring to the same units in the same dataset (PSID). This comparison obviously
requires that there is no difference in t h ed a t as o u r c e sa sw e l li nt h es p e c i ﬁcation
and estimation method, including the choice of instruments.
This same issue has been addressed in a few calibration models. Chang and
Kim (2005; 2006) combine the indivisible labor assumption and the heterogene-
ity of reservation wages in an incomplete markets model. Assuming an individual
elasticity of 0.4 they ﬁnd an aggregate elasticity of about 1, although this num-
ber is no longer related to the intertemporal substitution of leisure. Conversely,
Prescott, Rogerson and Wallenius (2006) assume a nonlinear mapping between
hours of work and labor services that generates virtually unrelated aggregate and
micro labor elasticities. Finally, Rogerson and Wallenius (2008) extend Prescott,
Rogerson and Wallenius (2006) by including age, which also affects productivity
2and labor supply decisions over time.
We are not aware of any other evidence addressing this issue by estimating
micro and a macro labor supply from the same data, chosen to allow for a con-
sistent and fully comparable aggregation procedure. Our empirical route relies
on aggregation of individual ﬁrst-order conditions – which allows us to solve the
aggregation problem [Blundell and Stoker (2005)] – in a life-cycle model where
the extensive margin matters because people, in equilibrium, are engaged in either
market or home production. Our model generates a mapping between individual
and aggregate elasticities: the latter is larger because people move into and out the
pool of workers in response to productivity shocks.
We use all of the annual waves (1968-1997) of the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID) to estimate the individual Frisch elasticity via a long-enough panel
to be compared with the corresponding time series resulting from the exact aggre-
gation of individual units each year. This procedure – which is not costless for
reasons we will discuss later – offers an important advantage: the macro dataset
is based on exactly the same units of observation that compose the micro dataset,
and allows us to employ “isomorphic” micro and macro regressions.
Ourpanelestimate, whichbyandlargefollowsthepioneeringstudyofMaCurdy
(1981), delivers a Frisch elasticity of about 0.1, a small value that is consistent
with benchmark micro estimates. The aggregate time series delivers instead a
Frisch elasticity of about 1. We decompose such aggregate elasticity into the con-
tribution of adjustment of hours per worker and of employment, ﬁnding that the
latter accounts for most of the difference between the two elasticities we estimate.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the relevance of
disentangling between the intensive and the extensive labor margin. Section 3
illustrates the theoretical model. Section 4 presents our results and Sections 5
concludes. A detailed Data Appendix is available in Section 6.
2 Intensive vs. Extensive Margin
The indivisible labor case [Rogerson (1988); Hansen (1985)], where individu-
als either work a ﬁxed amount of hours or do not work at all, accommodates in
an extreme way the well-known evidence that labor adjustment on the extensive
margin dwarfs adjustment on the intensive margin [Cho and Cooley (1994)]. Like
in Hansen (1985), if we denote by nt the employment stock and by ht the average
supply of hours, then aggregate labor is Ht ≡ ntht. By taking logs, the variance










The share of the total variation that is due to nt provides a measure of the
importance of the extensive margin. For quarterly US data ranging from 1955
to 1984, Hansen (1985) ﬁnds that employment changes account for 55% of the
total hours deviations from the HP trend, while the hours per worker deviations
accountforonly20%. Thispatternisobservedinseveralcountries: inHP-ﬁltered,
quarterly manufacturing data (1960-1989), Fiorito and Kollintzas (1994) found
thatthevolatilityofemployment deviations fromthesmooth trendalways exceeds
the corresponding volatility in hours per worker: by a factor of about eight in the
US, about four in Canada and West Germany and between two and three in the
UK and in Japan, respectively.
The wedge between individual and aggregate elasticities, as conventionally
estimated, reﬂects such a primacy of the extensive margin. This is easy to see in
a regression framework. Henceforth, we use lower case for individual variables
and upper case for the corresponding aggregate quantity. Denote by ε and E the
micro and macro Frisch elasticities of labor supply, respectively, by wt and Wt
the individual and aggregate wage rates at time t, respectively, and by ht the indi-
vidual hours worked. Consider the following MaCurdy (1981) regressions, which
provide the benchmark for estimating a Frisch elasticity:
individual : ∆lnht = const. +  ∆lnwt + et,( 2 )
aggregate : ∆lnHt = Const. + E∆lnWt + Et.( 3 )


















4That is, the micro elasticity (4) consists of a single term that captures adjust-
ment on the intensive margin only. The macro elasticity (5) instead, is the sum of
two terms representing the intensive and the extensive margins, respectively. No-
tice that the second term is the covariance between employment and the aggregate
wage rate which is positive if we move along a labor supply curve. Intuitively,
since we do not expect the “aggregate intensive margin”, i.e. the ﬁrst term in (5),
to be less than the individual elasticity, the aggregate elasticity is larger than the
individual one. This decomposition illustrates that individual and aggregate elas-
ticities are conceptually different objects [Prescott (2006)], at least because the
aggregate variable is the product of two components reﬂecting different decisions
and having, empirically, quite different relevance. To compare these different
elasticities in a meaningful way we need a model. This is what we turn to next.
3 The Model
Consider an economy populated by N individuals, indexed by i =1 ,...N.T h e r e
is a composite consumption good, which includes services and which can be pro-
d u c e do nt h em a r k e t( cM)o ra th o m e( cH). In both cases production is character-
ized by a constant returns to scale technology where labor is the only input. There
is no intermediate consumption. Individuals have identical preferences but differ
in productivity and endowments.
Denote by θit and θ
H
it two random variables representing individual i’s pro-
ductivity on the market and at home, respectively, at time t,a n db yhit and hH
it
the fraction of hours spent producing on the market or at home. Market and home
productivities evolve stochastically following idiosyncratic i.i.d. shocks. Total























5In other words, work on the market and at home are perfect substitutes in
production, and the respective outputs are perfect substitutes in consumption.1
Labor services can be sold on the market at a wage rate wit.P r o ﬁt maximization
implies that wit = θit is the market wage of individual i at time t. Individuals
are assumed to be forward-looking and markets clear. Due to data limitations,
we assume that the tax rate on labor is constant, so that it is immaterial whether
the wage rate is pre- or after-tax. Preferences are deﬁned over consumption (c)
and leisure (l), and are represented by E0
P∞
t=0 β
tu(cit,l it),w h e r eu(cit,l it) is a
strictly increasing, twice differentiable, strictly quasi-concave function, and β is
the discount factor.
The individual problem is to choose sequences of consumption, {cit}
∞
t=0,l a -
bor supply to market, {hit}
∞





t=0, as well as asset
holdings, {ait+1}
∞










subject to : (9)




it +( 1+r)ait + zit,
hit + h
H
it + lit =1 ,
where r i st h er e a lr e t u r no na s s e t s–w h i c hw ea s s u m et ob ec o n s t a n ti nt i m e
and across individuals – zit summarizes other exogenous sources of income. The
no-Ponzi game condition, limT→∞ β
T ∂u(ciT,liT)
∂ciT aiT+1 =0 , is also required to hold.
In order to derive a structural equation, we assume that utility is separable in










,( 1 0 )
where α>0 reﬂects the relative preference for leisure.
Denoting by λit marginal utility of wealth, and by νM
it and νH
it the multipliers
of the non-negativity constraints on hours spent producing on the market and at











¢η = λitwit + ν
M












it,( 1 3 )
ait+1 : λit = β (1 + r)Et [λit+1],( 1 4 )




it +( 1+rt)ait + zit.( 1 5 )
Individuals will either supply a positive number of hours to the market or
spend a positive number of hours at home but never both, their choice depending
at time t on the difference between market productivity θit and the individual
































lnλit,( 1 8 )






lnwit,( 1 9 )
lnλit =l n β (1 + r)+l nEt [λit+1],( 2 0 )
where k ≡− η−1 lnα is a constant. Equation (19) cannot be estimated, since we
do not observe λit. If it were estimated as it is, i.e. including η−1 lnλit in the error
term, one would be estimating the Marshall, rather than Frisch, elasticity. Follow-
ing Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) we deal with this issue as follows. Deﬁne a
one-step-ahead forecasting error in marginal utility of wealth as:
εit =l nλit − Et−1 [lnλit].( 2 1 )
7Equations (20) and (21) allow to characterize the implicit stochastic process
for λi:2
lnλit = −lnβ (1 + r)+l nλit−1 + υit,( 2 2 )
where υit ≡ εit − lnEt−1 [exp(εit)]. Next, denoting by ∆Xt ≡ Xt − Xt−1 the







∆lnwit.( 2 3 )
Substituting (22) into this equation and deﬁning eit ≡ η−1υit, we obtain:
∆lnhit = const. +
1
η
∆lnwit + eit,( 2 4 )
i.e. a standard MaCurdy regression which allows to estimate η−1, the intertempo-
ral (Frisch, or λ-constant) elasticity of labor supply. We interpret eit as containing
an individual ﬁxed-effect, and label (24) the “micro” regression.
Aggregating hours supplied to the market, i.e. equation (16), across individu-
als who are employed – i.e. across the nt ≤ N workers – yields aggregate labor
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wit,( 2 6 )
where we are assuming that the ﬁrst nt individuals are market workers. We treat
the working-age population, N, as constant. This implies that the market/home
production choice reﬂects only relative productivities, which are not related to age
or other demographic factors. We denote by Wt the “imputed” average wage, i.e.
the weighted average of the observed market wages for actual workers (wit) and
the unobserved reservation wages (e wit) claimed by non-workers:
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.( 2 8 )
Here, e θ
H
t denotes the average productivity at home of non-workers whereas
the “imputed” wage variable Wt i st h es a m ea st h ei m p u t e d average productivity
of both market and home workers. We denote by Θt such an average. Actual and
“imputed” mean wages are balanced in each period by a parameter δt:
Wt = W
δt
t .( 2 9 )










t into (25) and
taking logs yields:









λitθit + vt,( 3 0 )
where vt ≡− η−1 lnΘt. If we take the average market wage of workers – which
we observe in the data – to be the appropriate aggregate wage rate, then the Frisch
macro labor elasticity is δt times the micro elasticity. This reﬂects the individual
trade-off between market and home production, i.e. decisions on the extensive
margin. The aggregate elasticity is larger than the individual one when δt > 1,
which is equivalent to Wt >W t. From equation (28) it is immediate to see that
this is the case when:
e θ
H
t >W t,( 3 1 )
i.e. when the average reservation wage of non-workers is larger than the average
market wage of market workers.
Condition (31) is testable, provided equation (30) is identiﬁed. The problem
here is the same encountered in the micro case: neither λit nor θit are observed
for all individuals. However, we can rewrite equation (22) as
λitθit = −λit−1θitβ (1 + r)exp(υit).( 3 2 )




λitθit = −lnβ (1 + r)+l n
N P
i=1
λit−1θit exp(υit).( 3 3 )
Deﬁne Et = vt +l n
PN
i=1 λit−1θit exp(υit) − ln
PN
i=1 λit−1θit−1, replace in





∆lnWt + Et,( 3 4 )
where we replace for estimation purposes the time-varying parameter δt with its
constant counterpart δ. This simplifying assumption is not too strong because
in our PSID sample the employment rate ranges between 91% and 94% with a
coefﬁcient of variation which is rather small, about 1%.3 To summarize, we will
estimate models (24) and (34) as follows:
individual : ∆lnhit = const. +  ∆lnwit + eit,( 3 5 )
aggregate : ∆lnHt = Const. + E∆lnWt + Et.( 3 6 )
Comparing equations (34) and (36) it should be noted that the aggregate elas-
ticity parameter E does not reﬂect the extensive margin only but accounts also for
the intensive elasticity parameter η. The latter plays no role when the reservation
wage heterogeneity occurs instead in an indivisible labor model. Hence, although
our results are empirically similar to those of Chang and Kim (2005; 2006), our
aggregate elasticity is still related to the willingness to substitute leisure over time.
4R e s u l t s
Our estimates use data obtained from the core sample of the PSID. This is not
a costless choice because in this panel one does not ﬁnd, for all waves, such
important labor supply variables as wealth, tax rates, and the real interest rate.
3The PSID employment rate is high compared to the US population since it over–represents
employed individuals (see Data Appendix).
10However, it has an important advantage: it covers 35 years, thus allowing for the
construction of a relatively long time series for this type of data. For estimation
purposes, however, our series is shorter than it might otherwise be. The reason is
that PSID data were collected annually from 1968 to 1997, and every two years
afterwards: in order to avoid arbitrary interpolation of the microdata, we preferred
using only the annually released portion of the panel.
We aggregated each wave to create a macro series to be used for comparing
in a fully consistent way the micro and the macro labor supply elasticity. We are
aware that our sample is not representative of the US population and, therefore,
we do not claim to provide the right estimate of the aggregate elasticity of labor
supply in the US. This is not the goal of the paper which instead is estimating the
m i c r oa n dm a c r oe l a s t i c i t i e so nt h eb a s i s of a consistent aggregation procedure.
However, when we compare in the Data Appendix the properties of our series
with aggregate US data, it turns out that they are not too dissimilar.
As in MaCurdy (1981), we exclude from the sample permanently disabled
or retired individuals, i.e. we include only those units displaying nonzero wage
and labor supply data in any particular year. We also use two dummy variables
to account for important modiﬁcations underwent by the PSID in 1993 and 1996
(see the Data Appendix for details).
I ti sw e l lk n o w nt h a tw a g er e p o r t e di nt h eP S I Dm a yb ea f f e c t e db ys u b s t a n t i a l
measurement errors (Pischke 1995). Such errors are likely to be washed-out by
aggregation but remain a concern in the individual regression. As a check, we will
later exclude self-employed individuals – wages in this category are more likely
to be affected by relevant measurement errors.
In estimating the ﬁrst-difference equation (35) we use, as in MaCurdy (1981),
the ﬁxed effects estimator to mitigate the problems arising from the limitations
of the data. While this prevents us from estimating the long-run labor supply re-
sponse to productivity, it should also avoid mixing substitution and income effect,
since the latter is likely to prevail in the long-run.
In a rational expectations framework, we use lags as instruments toaccount for
the endogeneity of the real wage. The perfect correspondence between our micro
and macro estimates is ensured – among the other things – by the fact that we use
exactly the same instruments in both cases. Therefore, the autoregressive terms
enter the micro and the macro equations with exactly the same lags, although
aggregation may change the dynamics pertaining to each individual component
[Granger and Newbold (1986)]. This possibility is another reason for regressing
ﬁrst-differenced data which tend to reduce (or eliminate) differences in persis-
tence, otherwise to be dealt with via a longer series of instruments in the macro
11estimate.
O u rm a i nr e s u l ti ss u m m a r i z e di nT a b l e1 . C o l u m n1r e p o r t si n s t r u m e n t a l
variables ﬁxed-effects estimates of the individual elasticity while Column 2 re-
ports instrumental variables estimate of thea g g r e g a t e ,t i m e - s e ries, elasticity. The
LHSvariablesarethevariationinlogindividualandaggregatehours, respectively.
The RHS variables are the variation in log individual and aggregate wage rates de-
ﬂated by the consumer price index. Instruments are in both cases the 2nd, 3rd and
4th lags of the individual and aggregate wage rates, respectively4.












* Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** Signiﬁcant at 5% or better
The macro elasticity (1.06) is much larger than the estimated individual elas-
ticity (0.11): a result which is very robust, being always conﬁrmed by side esti-
mates (not shown) where we check for the role of nonlabor income and for the
use of pre-1993 data only, to avoid the inclusion of the 1993 and 1996 dummies.
The effect of nonlabor income coefﬁcient is negative and negligible in the (un-
changed) micro equation while negative and insigniﬁcant in the macro regression
where the wage elasticity increases to 1.4. When using pre-1993 data only, the
individual elasticity remains 0.1, while the aggregate elasticity increases to 1.5.
4Instruments are in log levels rather than in log differences for the efﬁciency reasons outlined
by Arellano (1989).
12Finally, when using the full - rather than the core - PSID sample, the individual
elasticity is still 0.1 while the aggregate is only slightly reduced (0.9).5
We ﬁnd noteworthy that the aggregate elasticity is not only an order of mag-
nitude larger than the individual one but that is also consistent with the unit value
often assumed in calibration studies. The J-stat shows that instrument over-
identiﬁcation is not a concern in the micro estimate. This test is less satisfactory
in the aggregate estimate, probably because the aggregate wage is less related to
aggregate productivity.6
Table 2. Individual Frisch elasticity: Heckit and employees only
∆ln(hit)
123
∆ln(wage) 0.11** 0.17** 0.17**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Heckit yes no yes
Self-employed yes no no
J- s t a t 0 . 2 81 . 4 91 . 4 8
p - v a l u e 0 . 8 70 . 4 70 . 4 8
Observations 42,280 38,169 38,169
Individuals 4,276 4,076 4,076
* Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** Signiﬁcant at 5% or better
Since the estimate of the individual elasticity may suffer from ignoring the
zero-hours wages, we present in Table 2 the results obtained with an “Heckit”
estimator.7 The individual elasticity (see Column 1) does not differ from the
benchmark elasticity reported in Table 1. To control for a possible source of mea-
surement error in the wage rate and still using the same instruments as in the
5All of these regressions are available upon request.
6This may be due to the fact that bargaining and other forms of interaction introduce some
dependence among the single units.
7The predicted probability of participation (positive hours) is produced by aﬁxed-effects probit
regression of the participation indicator on age, sex, family income and size. These are then used
to construct the inverse Mills ratio, whose ﬁrst difference is used as an additional regressor.
13benchmark regression, we excluded-self employed individuals. The correspond-
ing elasticity is reported Column 2. The same result is obtained in the correspond-
ing “Heckit” regression (Column 3): in both cases, the micro elasticity is slightly
increased (0.17) with respect to the benchmark case (0.11). An implication of
Table 2 is that correcting for selection does not introduce into our individual esti-
mates the same shift which occurs when ther o l eo ft h ee x t e n s i v em a r g i ni sm a d e
explicit, i.e. when the decision of entering or leaving the labor market is made
observable through the aggregation channel.8
In Table 3 we split the Macurdy regression (36) into the two terms of equation
(5), separately estimating, using the same instruments, the aggregate elasticity of
average hours per worker and the employment level. The aggregate elasticity of
hours per worker is 0.16 – a value that not surprisingly is close to the individual
elasticity of Tables 1 and 2 – while the elasticity of employment, i.e. the extensive
margin, is 0.9. Therefore, the latter accounts for virtually all of the difference
between micro and macro elasticities, conﬁrming the unconditional stylized facts
evidence on the relative importance of the two margins of adjustment. In both the
individual andtheaggregateregressionstheconstant hasanatural interpretationin
terms of a time trend in hours worked. Therefore, in our sample, aggregate labor
supply increases by about 1% per year, with no trend in average hours worked by
individuals. This is in fact possible if the extensive margin is the principal margin
of adjustment.












* Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** Signiﬁcant at 5% or better
8It is well known that in practice Heckman-correction may not make a big difference [Mofﬁtt
(1999)].
145C o n c l u s i o n s
Using PSID data for about 30 years (1967-96), we consistently compare the in-
dividual and the aggregate Frisch elasticities of labor supply in a MaCurdy-type
equation. The panel estimate of the individual labor supply elasticity differs by
an order of magnitude from the time-series estimate obtained by aggregating each
year the hours worked in the sample. For the micro elasticity we ﬁnd a low value
(0.11) in line with mainstream empirical results. For the macro elasticity, we ﬁnd
a relatively large value (1.06) which is not too far from the pioneering estimate of
Lucas and Rapping (1969). This value also suggests that a large body of business
cycle analysis based on a log-log speciﬁcation of preferences might have a sound
empirical base.
This difference between micro and macro elasticities is not new in the liter-
ature and is often invoked as a reason for rejecting the RBC model. Our result,
however, shows that there is no contradiction between the two, because they per-
tain to two different variables and concepts: the intensive margin in one case and
its product with the much more volatile extensive margin, in the other. The issue
is not aggregation bias. The underlying utility maximization model aims at ex-
plaining the dominance of the extensive margin on the basis of the intertemporal
and intra-temporal choice between leisure and labor to be allocated to market- or
home-production.
We recognize a number of limitations in our data and we do not interpret our
results as necessarily relevant for the US and even less for other countries for
which sufﬁciently long data are unavailable. In particular, we cannot employ a
number of important controls such as marginal tax rates, individual wealth, and
the individual interest rate.
The main contribution of this paper is showing that aggregation alone leads
to a much larger elasticity than one ﬁnds in micro estimates because micro es-
timates are apparently unable to reﬂect participation decisions, even when using
some selectivity correction mechanism. We regard our work as a simple empirical
exercise, but we are not aware of other empirical studies indicating the relevance
of the extensive margin via the exact aggregation of the individual units. Our re-
sult also suggests a methodological point: parameter estimates from micro data
are not always appropriate for calibrating an aggregate model economy.
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196 Data Appendix
In this appendix we provide additional details on our dataset. In particular, we compare
the time series derived from aggregating individuals in the PSID with ofﬁcial aggregate
US data (sources: BLS and OECD labor statistics).
Figure 1 reports series of the means of key demographic and labor variables (age,
sex, employment rate). This gives a rough picture of the population we are working
with, as well as its dynamics. It is clear that our sample is not representative of the US
population:9 men and workers are substantially over-represented. The reason is that we
use family rather than individual data – full longitudinal information on labor supply and
wages is available only in the ‘family’ portion of the PSID. As a consequence, our units of
observation are household heads: these, by convention, are males when a family includes
a married couple.






































































































































Age (left scale) Percentage Male (right scale) Employment Rate (right scale)
Figure 2 shows the series of average hours worked by employed individuals. Both
series refer to total employment. The US aggregate series is smoother than the PSID
series. Although they tend to move together (the coefﬁcient of correlation is 0.51), there
is anoticeable difference inlevels: on average, individualsin ourPSIDsample work every
year 100-200 hours more than US workers. This is at least partly explained by the over-
representation of men, who typically work more than women. The different volatility may
9These are unweighted statistics. Using sampling weights (as provided by the PSID)
does not change things signiﬁcantly. Weighted means are available from the authors upon
request.
20be due to changes occurring in the panel due to attrition and—most importantly—to the
inclusion of new households in the survey.







































































































































PSID (left scale) USA (right scale)
Table 4. Variation in the composition of the PSID (annual waves)
Year Collected Sample Size Variation Year Collected Sample Size Variation
1967 4802 1982 6852 1.63%
1968 4460 -7.12% 1983 6918 0.96%
1969 4654 4.35% 1984 7032 1.65%
1970 4840 4.00% 1985 7018 -0.20%
1971 5060 4.55% 1986 7061 0.61%
1972 5285 4.45% 1987 7114 0.75%
1973 5517 4.39% 1988 7114 0.00%
1974 5725 3.77% 1989 9371 31.73%
1975 5862 2.39% 1990 9363 -0.09%
1976 6007 2.47% 1991 9829 4.98%
1977 6154 2.45% 1992 9977 1.51%
1978 6373 3.56% 1993 10764 7.89%
1979 6533 2.51% 1994 10401 -3.37%
1980 6620 1.33% 1995 8511 -18.17%
1981 6742 1.84% 1996 6747 -20.73%
21This issue is illustrated in Table 4, where we report the percentage variations in the
PSID sample during the period 1967-1996. While changes in the composition of the
panel is not a concern when estimating the individual elasticity—the only consequence
is an unbalanced panel—this is not the case for the aggregate elasticity. The reason is
that variations in employment will reﬂect exogenous modiﬁcations of the sample. The
troublesome years are those when the PSID underwent substantial modiﬁcations. After
minorvariationsuntil1988(except1968, whichdoesnot affect ourestimatedsinceweuse
3 lags as instruments), we notice a few major changes. First, the 1990 wave (containing
data collected in 1989) was almost a third larger than the previous one. The reason is that
2,200 new households, the so-called Latino sample, were added to take into account the
substantial demographic changes occurred in the US since the inception of the PSID. The
remaining part of the Latino sample was subsequently dropped in 1995. This does not
affect our estimates because we work with the so-called core sample only. The 1994 wave
(i.e. our 1993 data) was also characterized by a sizeable increase in sample size because
of the inclusion of a large number of ‘recontacts’, i.e. persons who had been lost during
the 10 previous years. This is a signiﬁcant exogenous increase in sample size we need
to control for with a dummy variable. Finally, the 1997 wave (i.e. our 1996 data) was
released after a major reduction in sample size due to the attempt to reduce the cost of the
survey. This is another major exogenous variation we control for with a dummy variable.
Results from estimation using the shorter time series 1967-1992 show that in fact these
two dummies are appropriate and actually provide a conservative estimate.

































































































































22Figure 3 summarizes the same information reported in Figure 1 taking logs and using
ﬁrst differences. The ﬁgure conﬁrms that hours per workers in our sample and in the
US population, despite the differences noticed above, tend to co-vary (the coefﬁcient of
correlation of these transformed series in 0.64).
Figure 4 compares variations is the log real wage rate in the PSID and in the US. The
two series are not fully comparable because the US series is released by the BLS only for
private nonfarm workers involved in production and non-supervisory tasks. All nominal
values are converted into real terms using the CPI. The two series move quite closely
together, at least until the end of the 1980s.

































































































































Figure 5 shows the variation of log employment—the extensive margin–in the PSID
and the US. Again, while the PSID series refers to total employment in the sample, the
US series represents private nonfarm employment. The large variations in the PSID series
at the extremes (1968 and 1996) is explained by the large variations in the composition of
the sample in those years—see Table 5. Since, as we noticed above, year 1968 is not used
for estimation and year 1996 is alternately controlled for by a dummy or a shorter series,
such large variations do not affect our estimates. Between the two extremes and ignoring
year 1993 which is also controlled for by a dummy, the two series display some degree of
co-movement, especially in the ﬁr s tp a r t( c o e f ﬁcient of correlation 0.49 until mid-1985,
23and 0.24 overall), making us conﬁdent that we are not mixing, to any signiﬁcant extent,
variations in employment and in sample composition.
Figure 5. Variation of log employment.
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